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CONTROL OF AN AIR CARRIER BY
"ANY OTHER PERSON"--FLYING
BLIND UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
RAYMOND J. RASENBERGER*
Prompted by the ever-growing trend toward acquisition of diversified
business economic interests by single-corporate entities, Congress recent-
ly amended the Federal Aviation Act making it unlawful for any person
to acquire a controlling interest in an air carrier without approval of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Prior to the amendment any noncarrier or per-
son not engaged in aeronautics attempting to acquire control of an air
carrier could do so without CAB approval so long as control was sought
without a technical transfer of the air carrier's certificate. Mr. Rasen-
berger's article takes issue with the amendment for creating more prob-
lems than it solved. Noting that the legislation conferred unnecessarily
broad powers upon the CAB, he suggests guidelines for persons acquir-
ing a substantial stock interest or otherwise assuming an influential re-
lationship with an airline. The article concludes by suggesting the sensi-
ble approach to the new statute.
N AUGUST 20, 1969, President Nixon signed Public Law 91-62,'
making it unlawful for any person to acquire control of an air car-
rier' without approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. This legislation,
hastily conceived and quickly enacted, established, but did not illumi-
nate, a broad new area of regulatory jurisdiction. In the process new and
significant hazards were created for those acquiring a substantial stock
interest in an airline, or acquiring substantial influence through other
business or financial relationships.
The legislative history suggests that neither the Congress nor the ex-
* A.B., Dartmouth College; A.M., Syracuse University; J.D., George Washington
University. Member of the District of Columbia and Virginia Bars. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the valuable assistance and counsel of his partners Jerrold Scoutt,
Jr., and John H. Quinn, Jr., in preparation of this article, and the assistance of William
E. Donnelly, II with research and editing.
' Pub. L. No. 91-62, 83 Stat. 103 (Aug. 20, 1969). 49 U.S.C. S§ 1377, 1378 (1964),
as amended (Supp. V, 1969).
' "Air carrier," as used in the Federal Aviation Act, is a citizen that engages in air
transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (3) (1964). "Air transportation" means the carriage
by aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire or
the carriage of mail by aircraft and encompasses "interstate," "overseas," and "foreign"
air transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(10), (21) (1964).
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ecutive agencies had any idea of the uncertainties this law would intro-
duce into the financial aspects of airline operation. The uncertainties
have not since been dispelled. There have been few decided cases and no
interpretative guidelines. The purpose of this article is to point out some
of the pitfalls of this uncharted legislative territory and to suggest steps
that can be taken as a guide for those who must venture into it.
A. Background: Section 408-Old and New
Public Law 91-62 was the first major amendment to section 408 of
the Federal Aviation Act in its thirty year history.' Prior to the 1969
amendment, section 408 (a) (5) prohibited common control relation-
ships involving two or more air carriers, an air carrier and another com-
mon carrier, or an air carrier and a person engaged in a phase of aero-
nautics, unless approved by the CAB;" section 408 (b) set forth stan-
dards and procedures for such approval. The legislative history makes
clear' that the section was first enacted to assure adequate supervision
of possible anti-competitive activities in air transportation and to prevent
'The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964), is a reenact-
ment of the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The only amendment to 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378 (1964) between 1938 and 1968 was the addition of a third proviso to § 408(b)
in 1960, providing for non-hearing procedures in the case of uncontested acquisitions of
control. See note 92 infra.
'Section 408(a), prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 91-62, read as follows:
It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided
in this section
(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air carrier and any other
common or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to con-
solidate or merge their properties, or any part thereof, into one person
for the ownership, management, or operation of the properties theretofore
in separate ownerships;
(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an air carrier, any
other common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aero-
nautics, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any
substantial part thereof, of any air carrier;
(3) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to pur-
chase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any substantial part
thereof, of any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics otherwise
than as an air carrier;
(4) For any foreign air carrier or person controlling a foreign air
carrier to acquire control, in any manner whatsoever, of any citizen of
the United States engaged in any phase of aeronautics;
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other
common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics,
to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever;
(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to acquire
control, in any manner whatsoever, or any person engaged in any phase
of aeronautics otherwise than as an air carrier; or
(7) For any person to continue to maintain any relationship estab-
lished in violation of any of the foregoing subdivisions of this subsection.
49 U.S.C. 5 1378 (1964).
'For discussion of the statutory antecedents and legislative history of § 408, see
Allen, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act: A Study in Agency Law-Making, 45
VA. L. REv. 1073, 1077-82 (1959).
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possible domination of the then infant air transportation industry by
more powerful surface transportation interests.
Thirty years of Board decisions under section 408 reflect a scrupulous
adherence to the statutory purposes. Control relationships involving two
or more air carriers have been approved only under unusual circum-
stances The term "phase of aeronautics" has been given wide-sweep,"
and even though the original concern about domination of air carriers
by surface carriers is obsolete, such relationships have been tightly con-
strained
In deciding whether control exists, moreover, the Board has refused
to elevate form over substance. The term "control" has been broadly
and flexibly defined;' the Board has extended its writ under section 408
'Such approvals have been granted when the Board found no significant conflict of
interest between the two air carriers. See, e.g., Capitol Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
68-12-73 (Dec. 13, 1968) (control of air taxi by supplemental air carrier); Con-
tinental-Air Micronesia, C.A.B. Order No. E-24762 (Feb. 17, 1967) (control by
trunk carrier of air carrier restricted to air transportation pursuant to contract with
trust territory); San Francisco and Oakland Helicopter Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-24800 (Mar. 1, 1967); New York Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-23714 (May
20, 1966); and Los Angeles Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-23268 (Feb. 17, 1966)
all involved control by trunk carriers of helicopter carriers in financial distress. In these
and a few other instances when one carrier was in financial distress, common control has
been approved on an interim basis subject to extensive conditions restricting transac-
tions. See Caribbean Atlantic Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 70-11-142 (Nov. 27,
1970); American Airlines, Inc. and Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
70-12-108 (Feb. 25, 1970); Hughes Tool Co., C.A.B. Order No. 69-113 (Mar. 28, 1969).
' See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-25929 (Nov. 6, 1967);
(Bank participating in lease of aircraft); Flying Tiger Line, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-24030 (Aug. 2, 1966) (private carrier between foreign points); North Central Air-
lines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-13215 (Nov. 28, 1958) (aircraft dealer); Flight Enter-
prises, Inc.-Transocean Corp., 27 C.A.B. 562 (1958) (company selling and pumping
aircraft fuel); Clyde W. Sorrel, C.A.B. Order No. E-12891 (Aug. 14, 1958) (manu-
facturer with less than 1% of its sales to commercial airlines); Frank V. Gandola, 24
C.A.B. 592 (1957) (travel agent); Wm. Littlewood, C.A.B. Order No. E-7855 (Oct.
29, 1953) (aeronautical research laboratory); Atlas Corp., Control of Consolidated
Vultee, 9 C.A.B. 921 (1948) (manufacturer of aircraft parts).
8 When the applicant is a carrier other than an air carrier, the second proviso in 5
408(b) imposes the added requirement that the applicant must be able to show that the
transaction will promote the public interest by enabling it to use aircraft to public
advantage in its operation, and that this will not restrain competition. Following a
reversal in Pan American Airways v. C.A.B., 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941), the Board
adopted, as the test of compliance with the second proviso, the rule that the air car-
rier's services must be "auxilliary and supplemental" to those of the "other common
carrier." American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619, 624 (1942), aff'd 4 C.A.B. 104
(1943). See also Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379, 381 (1943).
This follows a similar approach by the ICC, cf. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, I M.C.C.
101, 113 (1936), 5 M.C.C. 9, 11-12 (1937). There has been some relaxation of the
Board's views in recent years. See TWA Acquisition of Sun Line, C.A.B. Order No.
71-1-4 (Jan. 4, 1971); Transamerica Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 70-9-54 (Sept. 10, 1970);
Motor Carrier Air Freight Forwarder Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 69-4-100, (Apr.
21, 1969), aff'd sub nom ABC Air Freight v. C.A.B., 419 F.2d 154 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1969). However, the Board's interpretation of the second
proviso has effectively barred any significant intermodal control involving a direct air
carrier.
'In an early statement that is often cited, the Board declared:
The decisions of the courts support the view that 'control' as used in sec-
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into the nooks and crannies of numerous business and financial relation-
ships.
Public Law 91-62 made important changes. It amended section
408 (a) (5) to include acquisitions by "any other person." It added
a proviso, however, allowing the Board to approve the acquisition of
non-certificated carriers by exemption, i.e., without hearing." In addi-
tion, section 408(f)" was added making ownership of ten percent of
an air carrier's stock presumptive control.
Although described as merely "closing a loophole,.1. these changes do
substantially more. Prior to Public Law 91-62, the statute did not con-
ceive of air transportation as an exception to the ordinary right of per-
sons to engage in lawful businesses of their own choosing. Only in the
case of control by related businesses or other carriers, when anticompeti-
tive activities might threaten the Act's broad developmental objectives,
did Congress assert a regulatory interest. The new language makes the
exception into the rule. No one is free to acquire control of an air carrier
without the scrutiny of the CAB. In addition, under a broad "public in-
terest" test, the Board may assert the power to determine what types of
tion 408 does not necessarily depend upon the ownership of any specific
minimum percentage of stock or other ownership rights but rather de-
pends, in light of all the facts and circumstances in a particular case,
upon whether there exists as a matter of fact a power to dominate or an
actual domination of one legal personality by another.
Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379, 381 (1943).
1049 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(5) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1969) provides that it
shall be unlawful, unless approved by order of the Board:
For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other com-
mon carrier, any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, or
any other person to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner
whatsoever: Provided, That the Board may by order exempt any such
acquisition of non-certificated air carrier from this requirement to the ex-
tent and for such periods as may be in the public interest; .... (em-
phasis added to new language).
11 Subsection 408(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1969) provides
as follows:
For the purposes of this section, any person owning beneficially 10 per
centum or more of the voting securities or capital, as the case may be,
of an air carrier shall be presumed to be in control of such air carrier
unless the Board finds otherwise. As used herein, beneficial ownership of
10 per centum of the voting securities of a carrier means ownership of
such amount of its outstanding voting securities as entitles the holder
thereof to cast 10 per centum of the aggregate votes which the holders of
all outstanding voting securities of such carrier are entitled to cast.
Pub. L. 91-62 also enlarged disclosure requirements under 49 U.S.C. 5 1377(b) (1964)
to require reports at least annually by holders of at least 5% or more of a class of an
air carrier's capital stock. See 49 U.S.C. § 1377(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,
1969).
12 Hearings on H.R. 8261, 8322, 8323, Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Aeronautics of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Congress, 1st
Sess. 5 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as House Hearings]; Hearings on S. 1373 Before
the Comm. on Commerce, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. 63 (1969) [hereinafter referred to
as Senate Hearings].
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people will be allowed to control airlines, and to examine whatever fac-
tors, including business ability, character, motives and personal habits,
it deems pertinent.
This fundamental change was enacted by Congress less than six
months after the first bill was introduced." The legislative history does
not entirely explain the unusual speed, but it does provide insight into the
Congressional purposes. Numerous references to a threatened takeover
bid for Pan American World Airways by Resorts International, a con-
glomerate with alleged gambling interests in the Bahamas, are made
throughout the hearings and floor debates." Another carrier, Western
Airlines, also faced a takeover by an outsider." Further, the legislative
history evidences a general concern about the spread of conglomerates
into regulated industries."6
The proposed legislation enjoyed widespread support, not only from
the airline industry,"' but also from the interested governmental agen-
cies," which concurred with the broadened jurisdiction although with
some reservations about the form finally enacted. No one appeared at
the hearings to oppose the bills," and only one voice is recorded as op-
posed in each House."
"H.R. No. 8261 was introduced on March 6, 1969, and S. No. 1373 on March 7.
'4 Senate Hearings 22-3, 26. On the House floor, Congressman Dingell saw the issue
as a simple one: "The question is, Do we want gamblers moving in on a regulated
industry? The answer is 'No'." 111 CONG. REc. 6042 (daily ed. July 17, 1969).
" Senate Hearings 96.
"See H.R. REP. No. 91-261, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-185,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969). A year earlier, the conglomerate scare led to the en-
actment of Pub. L. 90-439, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (Supp. 1971), requiring disclosures by
persons intending to acquire 10% or more of any class of equity securities registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
'7 Senate Hearings 56-7.
"See House Hearings 4, 9, 82 (remarks of CAB Chairman Crooker); Senate Hear-
ings 82 (remarks of Asst. Secretary, Dept. of Transportation Paul W. Cherington);
Senate Hearings 35 (remarks of SEC Chairman Budge); House Hearings 38 (remarks
of SEC Commissioner Hugh F. Owens).
" Presumably, the views of airline stockholders were reflected by management's
support of the legislation, although it is not clear that a stockholder's interest in re-
straining takeover bids is identical with that of management.
2' In separate views attached to the Senate Committee Report, Senator Pearson
objected because of the absence of more detailed criteria in the bill to guide the actions
of the Board. This, he said, would be
.. . inviting a scope of inquiry by the Civil Aeronautics Board that may
well be unconstitutional. An undisciplined inquiry as to whether a non-
carrier person or entity is fit, willing, and able to operate an air carrier
could well lead to determinations based upon personal whim or prejudice
under guise of an inquiry related to the character, morals or good business
sense of the acquiring party.
Relating to these objections is the situation which this law potentially
creates. If any person seeks to acquire control of an air carrier and if
differences of opinion exist between that person and the current manage-
ment of that carrier, a likely result is that each of the opposing parties
would come before the Board and make statements about the character
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B. Issues Involving Application of New Section 408
The immediate concerns that pushed Public Law 91-62 toward quick
enactment have now receded. Pan American was not acquired by Resorts
International and conglomerates generally have come upon harder times.
The statute, however, is on the books and the penalties for a violation
can be severe, including devestiture,"1 fines," or even criminal prosecu-
tion."3 It is therefore necessary that "other persons" who anticipate sub-
stantial financial, or other relationships with airlines understand the
scope of the statute.
1. Will the Board view control by "any other person" by different stan-
dards than control by other carriers or phases of aeronautics?
The language in revised section 408(a) treats control by "any other
person" no differently than control by an air carrier, common carrier,
or person engaged in a phase of aeronautics. Did Congress, despite the
wording of the amendment, intend any distinctions? Are acquisitions by
"any other person" intended to be judged by a different standard than
other prohibited acquisitions? Does the ten percent presumption of sec-
tion 408 (f) apply with equal effect to those acquisitions formerly cover-
ed by the statute as well as those by "any other person"? In any case,
what effect does the presumption have on the measure of what constitutes
control?
These questions have not been presented to the Board, nor has it dis-
closed any effort to anticipate them. Thus, the answers, if any, require
heavy reliance on the legislative history. What history there is provides
little comfort for those who would have acquisitions by "other persons"
judged by a different standard than acquisitions by another carrier or
person engaged in a phase of aeronautics.
Of the several bills first introduced, H.R. 8261 and its companion
of the other. I think the recent attempts at air carrier acquisition are
excellent evidence of the type of situation which would evolve. I do not
believe that a public hearing presenting the promises and counterpromises,
the charges and countercharges of opposing parties will be productive of
the public interest.
S. REP. No. 91-185, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1969). On the House floor, Congressman
Rogers of Colorado opposed it as "a special bill for the benefit of Pan Am in order to
keep the management in control and not let the stockholders run it." 115 CONG. REC.
6041 (daily ed. July 17, 1969).
2 See Sherman, Interlocking Relationships, 15 C.A.B. 876 (1952); cf. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
22 Violators "shall be subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each such
violation. If such violation is a continuing one, each day of such violation shall con-
stitute a separate offense . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1) (1964).
"Violators "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be subject for the first offense to a fine of not more than $500, and for any sub-
sequent offense to a fine of not more than $2,000. If such violation is a continuing one,
each day of such violation shall constitute a separate offense." 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a)
(1964).
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S. 1373, most resemble the enacted version. These bills would have
amended section 408 (a) (5) to cover acquisitions of control by all per-
sons."' A new section 408(f) would have been included stating that
"any person owning beneficially 5 per centum or more of the capital
stock or capital of an air carrier shall be deemed to be in control of
such air carrier unless the Board finds otherwise."
The CAB supported the legislative objective but had reservations
about the method. As viewed by the Board, these bills would oblige it to
determine the existence of control upon the facts of each case, regard-
less of the five percent presumption. Although this would have merely
retained the then current practice of the Board, the continuation of that
practice under the broadened jurisdiction troubled the agency. Chairman
John Crooker of the Board pointed out:
The bills before the Committee do not make ownership of the stated per-
centage of stock proof of control, but rather create a presumption of con-
trol solely for the purpose of insuring scrutiny by the Board. A lesser
percentage well might constitute control and, in such a situation, the
Board would continue to be obligated under the bills before the Commit-
tee to determine whether an acquisition of control had in fact occurred. '
This determination of control on a case-by-case basis, as the Board
pointed out on several occasions to both the House and Senate Com-
mittees, could result in procedural burdens and delays with adverse con-
sequences to airline financing."
For this reason, the Board advanced its own alternative bill that would
drop the presumption and simply prohibit the acquisition of more than
ten percent of a carrier's capital stock or capital, or an increase in prior
holdings of more than five percent, without prior approval." It also
'This was accomplished by inserting the words "whether or not" between "person"
and "controlling" in § 408(a)(5). See supra note 10.
'House Hearings 27.
"
0 E.g., House Hearings 6:
[Ilt is the Board's view that any remedial legislation should be so framed
as to impose the minimum procedural burdens upon persons seeking to
purchase airline stocks, and also so as to permit prompt approval by the
Board where there is no basis for believing that the acquisition will be
contrary to the public interest. Otherwise, the effect of extending the
coverage of the act might be to hamper the air carriers in their financing
programs, since roadblocks would be placed in the way of purchases of
stock by large institutional investors such as mutual funds, insurance
companies, and the like. Furthermore, proceedings of the nature now re-
quired by section 408 not only are expensive and protracted, but also have
an unsettling effect upon the carriers' overall activities until their com-
pletion.
21The ten percent standard appeared in language suggested to the Senate Com-
mittee; Senate Hearings 11. When it appeared at the House hearings a week later, how-
ever, the Board left the percentage blank. It suggested in testimony that either five or
ten percent would be acceptable, although a preference for the latter was indicated.
House Hearings 8.
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would have allowed the Board to approve any acquisition without hear-
ing. In proposing this alternative, the Board pointed out that "[u]nder the
modifications we propose, the Board would achieve the objectives of the
bill with a minimum procedural burden and interference with carrier
financing or stock transfers.M
8
When questioned by the committees, Board representatives acknowl-
edged that their proposal would not reach a case of actual control based
on less than the percent of ownership specified in the legislation." How-
ever, the Board regarded this risk as small relative to the practical prob-
lems of requiring that control be determined according to the facts of
each case. As Chairman Crooker pointed out: " . . . more certainty in
percentage might be more desirable in the balance than the uncertainty
of what does constitute control."3''
A related concern about procedural burdens and delay of business
transactions is reflected in the testimony of Assistant Secretary Chering-
ton of the Department of Transportation:
It would be a mistake, in our judgment, however, to authorize or encour-
age the Board to engage in a boundless search for evidence relating to
every conceivable pro or con that might be involved. Such an expansive
inquiry could be used by the management of the to-be-acquired carrier
to perpetuate its control, without regard to the likely actual effects on the
carrier's transportation operations. In any event, it could lead to lengthy
delays in the resolution of particular cases."
These concerns about uncertainty and procedural delays did not
draw a sympathetic response from the Committees. The hearings, and
to a greater extent the Committee reports, reflect an uneasiness by the
Committee members about any legislation that might fail to reach
actual control under all possible circumstances. 2 The bill reported by
the Senate Committee adopted a ten percent presumption instead of the
five percent that was contained in S. 1373. However, it left the Board
with the unwanted discretion to determine whether other circumstances,
including ownership of less than ten percent might constitute control.3
8 House Hearings 7.
"Senate Hearings 21; House Hearings 10.
"Senate Hearings 26. These sentiments were shared by the C.A.B. General Coun-
sel, Joseph Goldman: "[T]he persons engaging in the securities transactions have to know
whether they need prior approval or not. So I'm not sure how you could implement a
discretionary power related to prior approval." Senate Hearings 22.
" House Hearings 84.
"s Senator Cotton observed, for example, during the hearings that "the present man-
agement of Pan American controls only 2 or 3 percent of its stock," and that the
Board's proposed ten percent standard, "wouldn't be effective since it is my under-
standing that the stock held by Resorts International is more than 9 percent but less
than 10 percent." Senate Hearings 23. The Senator's conclusion seems to be expressed
in his comment that "it may be a little dangerous to establish any artificial percentage
at all." Senate Hearings 19.
"sS. REP. No. 91-185, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
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The Senate Committee did, however, provide for mitigation of pro-
cedural requirements with a proviso authorizing the Board to exempt
"any acquisition .. . to the extent and for such periods as may be in
the public interest."3 In addition, the Senate Committee adopted the
Board's suggestion that it be allowed to establish special procedures
for approval."'
The House Committee rejected the Board's proposal in stronger
terms. "There is no way," the Report stated, "that a particular per-
centage, whether it be 5, 10, or 15 percent, could be defined as actual
control of any or all carriers."' 6 After noting that the ten percent test
used in section 408(f) was selected as "an arbitrary but useful yard-
stick," the report pointed out: "To make certain that the Board has
sufficient power to look at all acquisitions, the Committee bill, as
amended, is written in terms of acquisition of control in any manner
whatsoever, which is intended to be more comprehensive than the
Interstate Commerce Act, section 1(3)(b) language."'
34 The reasoning of the committee in providing for the exemption authority follows:
The Committee feels that it may prove to be inappropriate to require sec-
tion 408 proceedings as a uniform prerequisite to acquisition of a con-
trolling interest in any class or type of air carrier, and this legislation
should not be utilized to unreasonably inhibit the financial security and
growth of the smaller carriers. Accordingly, the committee has provided
the Board with permissive authority to exempt from the prior approval
requirement air taxis, air freight forwarders, smaller supplemental car-
riers, or any other air carrier if such exemption will be consistent with the
objectives of the Federal Aviation Act, this legislation, and the public
interest.
Id. at 2-3.
5The proviso reads: "Provided, further, that in any case in which an order of ap-
proval is required hereunder only by reason of the requirements of section 408(a) (5),
the Board may enter such order pursuant to such procedures as it by regulation may
prescribe." The Committee explained that:
When this provision is read in conjunction with the prior paragraph it is
clear that the Board should not be unreasonably burdened by the re-
quirement that all acquisitions of control be subject to the prior approval
of the Board. Under the previous paragraphs the Board is empowered to
exempt any acquisition from the prior approval requirement if such would
be consistent with the public interest and the objectives of this bill. Addi-
tionally, this paragraph of the bill would allow the Board to adopt ex-
pediting procedures for consideration of acquisitions not so exempted
when such procedures would be fair and equitable to all parties of interest.
Id. at 3.
"H.R. REP. No. 91-261, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969).
3 Id. The emphasis on "any manner whatsoever" is somewhat puzzling since the
same words appeared in the statute prior to its amendment. The Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(b) (1964), provides, in part, that when reference is made to
"control",
[S]uch reference shall be construed to include actual as well as legal con-
trol, whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of the method
of or circumstances surrounding organization or operation, through or by
common directors, officers, or stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a
holding or investment company or companies, or through or by any other
direct or indirect means; and to include the power to exercise control.
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The House bill also limited the Board's procedural discretion much
more than the Senate. An exemption power was included but limited
to acquisitions of non-certificated air carriers. The proposed fourth pro-
viso, permitting the CAB to establish special procedures, was not
adopted at all.
The Committee bills were passed by the respective Houses without
amendment. In conference, the principal disagreement concerned the
scope of the Board's exemption authority. The Conference Report,
after noting that the House version "did not authorize the Board to
prescribe expedited procedures and dispense with an evidentiary hear-
ing," adopted that version."
It is difficult to read this history without concluding that Congress
was less concerned about the procedural burdens than the possibility
that some form of control might escape CAB review. Despite the adop-
tion of the ten percent presumption, it appears that Congress had
no intention of modifying the Board's traditional view of control as a
question that can be determined only after examination of all the
facts."' Thus, regardless of procedural burdens, expense, or delay,
persons proposing to enter into a relationship that might, according
to the Board's traditional views, constitute control must obtain prior
approval. Moreover, the cases hold that, regardless of the percentage
of ownership or intervening corporate entities, it will be up to the
Board, not the affected party, to make the initial determination whether
the relationship requires approval.' Those who enter into questionable
3' H.R. REP. No. 91-426 (conference rep.), 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1969):
The substitute agreed to in conference follows the House version. The
committee of conference felt that the exemption authority of the Board
with respect to noncertificated carriers eliminated the possibility that the
Board would be overburdened with hearings on acquisitions of control.
In the case of certificated carriers, particularly the smaller supplementals,
the committee of conference expects the Board to process any acquisition
proceedings with all due speed.
"' As viewed by the Senate Committee:
... a legal presumption of control is created by ownership of 10 percent
or more of an air carrier, but that presumption would be rebuttable with
the burden of proof in such a case on the party alleging lack of control.
Conversely, ownership of less than 10 percent of an air carrier could not
be presumed to be control by the Board, but that presumption could as
well be overcome by proof to the contrary, such burden to be borne by
the Board.
S. REP. No. 91-185, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969).
"The Board has generally taken the position that persons involved in possible con-
trol relationships are not free to determine whether the Board has jurisdiction without
reference to the Board itself. See, e.g., Caledonian Airways, C.A.B. Order No. 70-5-113,
2 (May 25, 1970): "The instant application was properly filed since the Board has
initial jurisdiction over the matter to determine whether the separate corporate entities
should be recognized and thus whether or not the relationships come within the pur-
view of section 408 of the Act."
See also West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Case, 42 C.A.B. 561, 563 (1965):
The examiner applied the legal precedents involved in voting trust cases,
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relationships without either Board approval or a ruling that the Board
will not assert jurisdiction do so at their peril.
What then is the significance of the section 408(f) presumption?
Portions of legislative history indicate that the intent was to place the
"burden of proof" on the applicant where more than ten percent was
acquired, and on the Board where the ownership was less than ten
percent. When a stock acquisition leads to holdings exceeding ten per-
cent, the presumption may have significance in the sense of requiring
more extensive proceedings. 1 On the other hand, when acquisitions
result in less than a ten percent concentration, it is not at all clear how
this theory would accomplish a real change from current practice. For
example, the presumption could be interpreted as placing the burden
of going forward with evidence on the Board in an evidentiary pro-
ceeding. However, the Board's staff already takes an active role in seeing
that evidence necessary for a decision is adduced in such proceedings.'
If the presumption is given a more extreme interpretation, one which
would excuse the parties from filing an application when less than
ten percent is involved (thus placing the burden on the Board to bring
control proceedings after the acquisition), its effect could be very sig-
nificant. There are numerous means of control involving no stock
ownership at all. However, for this very reason it is most unlikely that
the Board would adopt such a view. In the final analysis, therefore, it
appears that section 408(f) will assume a relatively insignificant role,
serving as a "guidepost" that "merely raises the flag for the Board to look
closely at the deal,"' but accomplishes no substantive change in the con-
cept of control.
2. What circumstances may constitute an acquisition of control by
"any other person"?
Since Public Law 91-62 appears to invoke the conventional tests
and pointed out the difference between those in which the Board has
approved a trust agreement submitted to it for approval to vindicate the
public interest and an agreement designed to escape the Board's juris-
diction over the possible control relationship. He also found, as a matter
of fact, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, that the voting trust
would not prevent West Coast from exercising control.
We agree with both the examiner's findings of fact and conclusion of
law with regard to the violation.
"
1See REA Holding Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 70-7-142 (July 30, 1967).
The Board has applied the presumption of S 408(a) (5) to acquisitions formerly
covered by the statute, as well as acquisitions by "any other person." See, e.g., Georgia
Highway, C.A.B. Order No. 70-4-85 (Apr. 17, 1970). In view of this, and the absence
of any differentiation in the statute itself, § 408(f) will presumably be construed as
applicable to both "old" and "new" acquisitions.42Moreover, as a practical matter, questions concerning the burden of proof tend
to have little significance in C.A.B. decisions, with the possible exception of enforce-
ment actions.
41 115 CONG. REC. 6038 (daily ed. July 17, 1969) (remarks of Congressman Nelsen).
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of control, it remains to consider, in light of the cases, what factors
may bring a relationship involving "any other person" within possible
reach of the CAB.
(a) Stock Ownership
The Board's historic view has been that control does not depend
upon any specific minimum percentage of stock ownership." There is
every reason to assume that this view will be applied to acquisitions by
"any other person." Presumably, the Board will continue to look at
the realities rather than the formalities of ownership. Indirect ownership
will be examined as carefully as direct," beneficial as carefully as rec-
ord." The Board will also pierce the corporate veil, as it has on numerous
occasions, to determine whether a control relationship exists requiring
its approval." Voting trusts not created under the Board's supervision
will be rejected as a means of control." Nor will the division of stock
ownership among different individuals negate Board jurisdiction if there
is an intention, or a substantial likelihood, that the stock will vote as a
unit." Stock options, warrants and convertible notes may also be con-
'"See, e.g., Acquisition of Mid-West by Purdue Research Foundation, 14 C.A.B.
851, 856 (1951); Acquisition of China National Aviation Corp. by Pan American Air-
ways Corp., 6 C.A.B. 143, 146 (1944); Pan American Airways, Inc., Acquisition of
Aerovias de Mexico, 4 C.A.B. 494, 496 (1943); Pan American Airways, Inc., Acquisi-
tion of Aerovias de Guatemala, 4 C.A.B. 403, 405 (1943); Railroad Control of North-
east Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943). See also Application of Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-25416 (July 13, 1967) (2.24% plus substantial debt
interest).
"Section 413 of the Federal Aviation Act states: "For the purposes of this title,
whenever reference is made to control, it is immaterial whether such control is direct
or indirect." 49 U.S.C. S 1383 (1964).
"See notes 48, 49 inf ra.
41 See, e.g., Minnesota Enterprises, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24942 (April 4, 1967);
RKO General, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24296 (Oct. 17, 1966); Trans Caribbean
Airways, Disclaimer, 38 C.A.B. 1198 (1963); Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B.
473 (1948).
The Board will generally treat a holding company as if it were the carrier itself.
See, e.g., Air Land Freight Consolidators, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-3-10 (Mar. 4,
1969); American Express Co., Operating Authorization, 31 C.A.B. 118 (1960); Air
Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473 (1948), supra; American Export Airlines, Inc.,
Acquisition of TACA, 3 C.A.B. 216 (1941).
Where the relationship appears to be harmless, the Board may disclaim jurisdiction,
e.g., Transportation Corp. of America, C.A.B. Order No. E-19939 (Aug. 22, 1963);
Studebaker Corp., Disclaimer, 37 C.A.B. 738 (1962).
"See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-25759 (Sept. 29, 1967);
New York Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24406 (Nov. 15, 1966); Watson-Wilson
et al., C.A.B. Order No. E-23115 (Jan. 11, 1966); West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforce-
ment Case, 42 C.A.B. 561 (1965). Mercury Service Systems, Control Relationships,
42 C.A.B. 847 (1965); Allegheny Airlines, Enforcement Proceeding, 41 C.A.B. 743
(1964); Maytag, Interlocking Relationships, 40 C.A.B. 161 (1964); Trans World Air.,
Control by Hughes, 32 C.A.B. 1363 (1960); Seaboard & Western, Agreements, 32
C.A.B. 1322 (1960); Atlas Corp., Interlocking Relationships, 31 C.A.B. 1 (1960).
4' See, e.g., Eastern-Colonial Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629 (1955). Family members
are almost automatically treated as a unit, e.g., Los Angeles Air Service, Inc., Control
and Interlocking Relationships, 26 C.A.B. 43 (1957).
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sidered as contributing to a control relationship." Moreover, any steps
significantly increasing preexisting control, even if already approved, will
require additional prior approval."
When stock ownership exceeds ten percent it appears that under
Public Law 91-62, the Board may feel obliged to take an even stricter
view of control than in the past. Prior to the enactment of Public Law
91-62, the Board had been able to find, without hearing, that owner-
ship interests greater than ten percent did not constitute control." In
REA Holding Corp.," a case arising after the amendment, the Board
found that, because of the presumption of section 408(f), a ten per-
cent and a twenty-five percent stockholder each held controlling inter-
est in the air carrier, even though a management group held another
forty-five percent. This presumption, the Board found, must be con-
clusive in the absence of a "full evidentiary record.""
Two other Board decisions under Public Law 91-62 suggest a more
restrictive policy. In Flying Tiger Line, Inc.," and Airlift International,
Inc.," cases involving the creation of its own parent by an air carrier,
the Board found it necessary to assert jurisdiction under Public Law
91-62, despite the carrier's argument that no change of substance was
taking place. Noting that it had previously disclaimed jurisdiction over
such transactions,' the Board pointed out:
However, with the passage of Public Law 91-62, effective August 5,
"In South Pacific Airlines, Inc., 27 C.A.B. 250 (1958), the Board declined to decide
whether an option constituted control under the facts of the case. However, in Pan
American-National Agreement Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 198 (1960), the Board found
that a plan of reciprocal leases with stock options constituted control. And in Trans-
continental & Western Air, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Co., 9 C.A.B. 381
(1948), the Board found that notes convertible into stock added to control. In an
earlier proceeding the Board had approved Toolco's ownership of 45% of TWA's
stock; however, the Board decided that the issuance to Toolco of the new notes re-
quired further approval since, if converted, Toolco would own 67% of TWA's stock.
See also Atlas Corp., Interlocking Relationships, 31 C.A.B. 1 (1960) (stock, including
warrants, placed in trust pending divestiture).
'1 Petition of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 68-9-86 (Sept. 20, 1968);
Trans World Airlines, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Co., 12 C.A.B. 192 (1950);
Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947).
"In Columbia Export Packers, 41 C.A.B. 773 (1964), the Board held that a 15%
interest did not constitute control where 76.3% was in the hands of another person.
"C.A.B. Order No. 70-7-142 (July 30, 1970). See note 41, supra.
Id. at 4; such a record had not been made because the relief was sought, and
granted, by exemption. See also C.A.B. Order No. 71-2-17 (Feb. 3, 1971), setting con-
trol question for hearing.
"C.A.B. Order No. 69-12-121 (Dec. 29, 1969), C.A.B. Order No. 70-6-119 (May
5, 1970).
Airlift International Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 70-6-120 (June 19, 1970).
'r See, e.g., Application of United Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-4-67 (Feb.
17, 1969). In the United case the Board could have implied jurisdiction on the basis
of its prior interpretation of § 408. However, it found that the transaction was not "of
substance from the standpoint of the Board's concern of jurisdiction." Id. at 2.
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1969, Congress in amending section 408 of the Act has indicated its
desire that the Board approve the acquisition of control of an air car-
rier by "any person." Congress indicated its concern with the financial
manipulation to which air carriers might be subjected by changes in
control, and also with the possibility that air carriers might be diverted
by those acquiring control from their principal function as common car-
riers."
(b) Creditor-Debtor Relationships
Board decisions also declare that a creditor may control an airline
solely by virtue of a creditor status" or in combination with other
relationships." The question whether an airline may be controlled by
one of its principal sources of financing, such as a bank or insurance
company, has not been reached by the Board. 1 At various times in
the past, however, the Board has been urged to assert jurisdiction over
these debt relationships on the theory that the lending institution was
a person controlling other air carriers or, by lending money to airlines,
was engaged in a phase of aeronautics. Sensitive to the broad implica-
tions of these conclusions, the Board has thus far managed to avoid the
issue."3
" Flying Tiger Line, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-12-121 (Dec. 29, 1969); C.A.B.
Order No. 70-6-119 (May 5, 1970).
"See American Airlines and Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
70-2-108 (Feb. 25, 1970); Hughes Tool Co., C.A.B. Order No. 69-3-113 (March 28,
1969); San Francisco and Oakland Helicopter Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24376
(Nov. 8, 1966); Toolco-Northeast Control Case, 34 C.A.B. 583 (1961), aff'd sub. nom.,
National Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 306 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Transocean-Atlas
Case, Interlocking Relationships, 29 C.A.B. 622 (1959). See also C.A.B. Chairman
Crooker's letter to the House Committee: "Furthermore, the Board has recognized that
control may exist by reason of a debtor-creditor relationship." See, e.g., National Air-
lines v. C.A.B., 306 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1962). House Hearings 27.
0The Board has found control when, in addition to debt, there was management
representation or voting stock in trust. See Pan American World Airways, Inc., C.A.B.
Order No. E-26762 (May 7, 1968); Northeast Airlines, Cancellation and/or Suspension,
31 C.A.B. 1003 (1960); Seaboard & Western, Agreements, 32 C.A.B. 1322 (1960).
But see Alaska Airlines, C.A.B. Order No. E-24078 (Aug. 12, 1966) (debt plus options
representing less than 8% of the outstanding shares-no control); Reopened Aero-
lineas Peruanas S. A., Foreign Permit Case, 31 C.A.B. 181 (1960) (debt to be repaid
soon-no control).
61 A tabulation of the principal sources of debt financing for airlines appears in the
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, tabs. 18, 19 at 118-123, 124-126
(1970).
2 Such an allegation grew out of litigation over control of TWA by Hughes Tool
Co. but the Board never had to decide the issue. See Hughes Tool v. Metropolitan Life,
38 C.A.B. 1147 (1963).
0 In recent years, airline financings have sometimes involved leases from banks
which, for investment tax credit purposes, have taken title to the aircraft. In such cases,
the bank has been found to be a person engaged in a phase of aeronautics. See Trans
World Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-25929 (Nov. 6, 1967); cf. George E. Keck
and United Air Lines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-23037 (Dec. 27, 1965); Charles H.
Tillinghast & Trans World Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24892 (May 24, 1967).
However, the question of control of other carriers by such institutions has not been
raised.
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A lending institution, however, clearly comes within the term "any
other person.'" ' The question is now presented whether the Board will re-
view relationships between airlines and their principal sources of debt
capital to determine on the facts of each case whether control exists.
Prior decisions suggest that control will be found when there is substan-
tial dependence by an airline on a single creditor," or when the terms of
the loan agreement, or a default thereunder, place the creditor in a
position to exert substantial influence upon the airline." Under these
standards the clear possibility now exists that the CAB could, for the
first time, play a significant role in the major airline financings.
(c) Management Control
If anyone controls an airline, presumably its principal officers do.
Prior to Public Law 91-62, however, questions of management control
did not arise under section 408 because of the largely parallel coverage
of section 409 of the Federal Aviation Act.' That section prohibits
an air carrier from having as an officer or director a person who is an
officer, director, or holds a controlling stock interest in any other com-
mon carrier or phase of aeronautics. Cases have arisen under section
408, however, involving management assistance agreements, the Board
finding that participation in management in an advisory capacity may
amount to control." This is illustrated by a recent order involving a
consulting contract between TWA and Air Siam." Under the agreement,
the Board found that "the TWA advisors will serve primarily as con-
" References to creditor control appear in the legislative history but shed little light
on the intent of Congress. Several times during the House Hearings, Congressman
Pickle raised the question of control by financial institutions, see, e.g., House Hearings
12, 24. The Board's responses, however, were narrow and dealt only with stock
pledged in conjunction with financing. Id. See also House Hearings 29.
The reference to "capital" as well as "voting securities" in § 408(f) appears to have
no significance on the question of creditor control. During the hearings, some wit-
nesses expressed concern that use of the term "voting stock or capital" in connection
with this language might be interpreted as referring to "all the assets or property of
the corporation" including debt. Letter from SEC, 115 Cong. Rec. 7519, 7520 (daily ed.
July 2, 1969). See also Senate Hearings 64. However, after first expressing the same
concern, Senate Hearings 57, C.A.B. Chairman Crooker wrote to the Senate Committee
pointing out that the term was already embodied in § 407 and was designed to cover
unincorporated air carriers. Senate Hearings 132. This appears to be the basis upon
which it was retained in the Senate bill.
I" See Meteor-Metropolitan Case, 26 C.A.B. 596 (1958); American Airlines DC-6-
Aircraft Syndicate, C.A.B. Order No. E-13092 (Oct. 24, 1958); Arthur Vining Davis,
Enforcement Proceeding, 24 C.A.B. 832 (1957).
0 See New York Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-23713 (Feb. 16, 1966); Hertz
Rent-A-Plane System, Enforcement, 31 C.A.B. 41 (1960).
6749 U.S.C. § 1379 (1964). Relationships through representatives or nominees are
also forbidden without prior CAB approval.
8 Trans World Airlines, Inc., and Ethiopian Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-24605
(Jan. 5, 1967); Pan American Acquisition of LACSA Case, 35 C.A.B. 343 (1962).
6 Trans World Airlines, Inc., and Varan Air Siam Air Co., Ltd., C.A.B. Order No.
71-2-13 (Feb. 3, 1971).
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sultants and will be under the direct supervision and control of Air
Siam's Board of Directors and senior management, and that TWA will
have no stock or other investment interests in Air Siam.""0 Nevertheless,
the CAB observed that:
The advisory personnel will be responsible, to a certain extent, for the
formulation of Air Siam's management policies and will become sub-
stantially involved in the overall operations of that carrier. When the
relationships are considered in light of the fact that Air Siam is a newly
formed carrier in its initial stages of operations, the instant agreement
would tend to indicate that the achievement of a viable operation by
Air Siam may be bottomed, to a substantial degree, on the TWA ad-
visory and technical assistance and Board approval of the arrange-
ments.'
The Board went on to find: "On the basis of the foregoing considera-
tions, we conclude that the advisory and assistance relationships may
well constitute control by TWA of the foreign air carrier .... )72 In the
light of such views the amended section 408 poses the question whether
the Board will assert jurisdiction over management changes not covered
under section 409, and, if so, what advisors or other persons will be
regarded as management.
Here again, the legislative history tells little. Nevertheless, the prob-
ability that Congress intended to confer broad new jurisdiction in this
area seems remote. Since section 409 has been the primary vehicle for
Board jurisdiction over management relationships, it is reasonable to
assume that, had Congress intended that the Board supervise manage-
ment control by "any other person," it would have amended that sec-
tion.73 Because of the broad implications of a contrary view, it would
be useful for the Board to disavow explicitly any claim of jurisdiction.
(d) Control through other business relationships.
Control may exist through relationships other than that of stock-




" The question of management changes came up briefly in the Senate Hearings and
the Board's response makes clear that it had no desire to get into the business of re-
viewing personnel changes:
Senator COTTON. 'Shouldn't there be provision made so that when there
is in ouster or there is about to be an ouster of the experienced manage-
ment of an airline, with new management to be substituted, you be
notified and have opportunity before the change is made to determine
whether such new management is fit, willing and able to do the job?'
Mr. CROOKER. 'Senator, there was some discussion that the Board study
this. It was felt, I think, that as far as officers were concerned, the di-
rectors of the corporation should be in position to take management steps
without requiring Board approval.'
Senate Hearings 25.
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may control his lessee when the relationship is one of substantial de-
pendence by the lessee." More recently, the Board has noted control
relationships growing out of agreements by one carrier to replace the
air service of another. These agreements generally have involved air
taxis taking over an uneconomic service of a larger carrier. Such agree-
ments generally result in the air taxi relying heavily on the larger carrier
for certain supporting services, such as reservations and ground hand-
ling; and these agreements sometimes give the larger carrier the right
to veto certain actions.7'
In all these cases, the existence of control appears to rest principally
on relationships involving substantial dependence by the air carrier.
The theory stems from a view to which the Board has often paid its
respects-the power to influence may be the power to control, and
hence subject to section 408.6 Without some retreat from this view,
all persons in a position to exercise substantial influence over air car-
riers are in danger, however unwittingly, of violating the Act and sub-
jecting themselves to its penalties.
3. Under the amended section 408, may an air carrier acquire control
of "any other person" without prior approval?
The language of section 408(a) (5) prohibits the acquisition of an
air carrier by a common carrier but not the acquisition of a common
carrier by an air carrier. For more than 20 years, however, the Board
' Meteor-Metropolitan, 26 C.A.B. 596 (1958). See also, Pan American-National
Agreement Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 198 (1960).
" Mohawk Airlines, Inc. Air North, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 70-2-23 (Feb. 6, 1970);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.-Pocono Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-3-42 (Mar. 11,
1969); Allegheny Airlines, Inc.-Henson Aviation, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-26836 (May
24, 1968); Eastern Airlines, Inc.-Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines, C.A.B. Order No.
68-10-35 (Oct. 8, 1968).
7 An oft-quoted passage from the examiner's initial decision in the Eastern-Colonial
Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629, 634-35 (1955), reveals the broad reach accorded the
term "control":
In ascertaining the existence of control of one company by another, it is
clear that control is an issue of fact which must be determined from a
broad consideration of the special circumstances of each case; that control
may be exercised in other ways than through a vote of the stock of the
corporation sought to be controlled; that control does not depend upon
the ownership of any specific quantum of stock or other ownership rights
but rather represents the amount of power and influence necessary to give
one company actual domination or substantial influence over another;
that power over another company's stock through affiliates, through close
business associates with the same interests, or power over stock holdings
exercised in combination with other factors bearing pressure upon the
company sought to be dominated may spell corporate control; and that,
while there is no technical meaning of control apart from that accorded
the term in ordinary usage, the term 'control' embraces every form of
control and may cover a wide variety of situations of fact. In short, it has
been consistently held that the term 'control' is not an absolute or un-
qualified concept but rather is one which involves the act or the power
of direction or domination under many varied circumstances.
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has held that its jurisdiction extends to both types of transactions."
This interpretation must now be examined in relation to the revised
section 408. If, by implication, the language forbids air carriers from
acquiring control of common carriers, does it now also forbid air car-
riers from acquiring control of "any other person"? In short, must prior
Board approval be obtained before an air carrier can acquire any sub-
sidiary?
The possibility that Public Law 91-62 would be so interpreted ap-
pears to have never occurred to its framers. Yet, unless the Board is
prepared either to withdraw a previous interpretation of section 408,
or make distinctions between common carriers and "other persons"
which the language of the statute does not, approval prior to acquisi-
tion of a subsidiary could be required. Of the two alternatives, the
first would appear to be the more defensible. The logic of the statute
has always been at odds with the Board's claim of reverse jurisdiction, "
and that theory becomes even more questionable under the revised
language of section 408."'
4. What tests will be used by the CAB in granting or withholding
approval of control by "other persons"?
Section 408(b) requires that the Board disapprove a control rela-
" Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 504 (1948). Within the last year, that
view has been reasserted by the Board:
Thus, section 408 is directed to common control relationships, and the
Board would be exalting form over substance were it to hold that the
acquisition of an air carrier by a person controlling a surface carrier was
within its jurisdiction, but that the acquisition of a surface carrier by a
person controlling an air carrier was not. The Board, therefore, has con-
strued the jurisdictional provisions of section 408 (a) in such fashion as to
permit it to assert jurisdiction over all common control situations between
the various types of carriers so that it may apply the public interest
standards of the section in accordance with the policy of the Act. As-
suming that we have correctly interpreted the coverage of section
408(a)(5), the first proviso of section 408(b) is plainly applicable both
in terms and in spirit to common control relationships irrespective of
whether the technical acquisition is by the air carrier or the surface carrier.
Trans America Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 70-9-54 at 8 (Sept. 10, 1970).
78 The original purpose of Congress was to avoid domination of an infant air trans-
portation industry by powerful surface carriers, not vice versa. See generally Allen,
supra note 5. Where Congress was concerned about who an air carrier acquired, it said
so. Thus § 408(a)(5) specifically prohibits air carriers from acquiring control of other
air carriers. Section 408(a)(6) specifically prohibits an air carrier from acquiring con-
trol of a person engaged in a phase of aeronautics. Section 408(a)(6) could easily
have mentioned common carriers as well as persons engaged in a phase of aeronautics,
had Congress intended to preclude such acquisitions by air carriers. See 49 U.S.C. 5
1378 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1969).
" For example, new § 408(f) speaks in terms of 10% of the voting securities or
capital "of an air carrier." To be consistent with its previous rulings, the Board must
now find either that the section 408(f) applies to acquisitions of a common carrier
despite the plain language, or that it applies to all acquisitions covered by 408(a)(5)
except acquisitions of a common carrier. See 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. V, 1969).
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tionship that is not in the "public interest." Despite the breadth of that
term," the Board has generally confined its concern to the possible
anti-competitive effects of a proposed acquisition. 1 Unrelated factors,
such as the applicant's business experience, motives and reputation,
have generally been ignored. Furthermore, control relationships have
usually been approved when the Board found no adverse effects on
competition, or could qualify its approval with conditions precluding
substantial transactions between the controlled entities.8'
Considering the reasons behind enactment of Public Law 91-62,
the Board's previous view of the term "public interest" as used in
section 408 needs to be reexamined. For example, it could be con-
cluded from the legislative history that gamblers or racketeers, foreign
interests and perhaps conglomerates are not meant to be acceptable
as controlling persons even if no anti-competitive effects are indicated.
To what extent is the Board bound by this legislative history? With
what characteristics of fitness should the Board be concerned? Assist-
ant Secretary Cherington highlighted the problem in his testimony
before the Senate Committee:
In considering the acquisition's consistency with the public interest
the Board should not attempt to weigh all the imponderables associated
with the acquirer's anticipated management of the carrier but should
confine its review narrowly to the purchaser's capacity to fulfill the
responsibilities imposed by the applicable certificates of public con-
venience and necessity. Beyond this determination, only two substantive
issues appropriately warrant scrutiny: the effect of the acquisition on
competition in air transportation and foreign control. We would urge
this committee to make clear in any report on S. 1373 that it anticipates
that the Board will interpret the legislation narrowly along these lines
rather than expansively. 3
The Committee did not include such language in its report. Never-
"
8 Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964), lists a num-
ber of factors which give content to the term. However, it specifically provides that the
public interest considerations enumerated therein are not exclusive.
" This first proviso of § 408(b) provides "[t]hat the Board shall not approve any
... acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies
and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the
acquisition of control." 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1964).
82See the cases collected in note 5, supra. In other instances the Board has ap-
proved on an interim basis common control of adjoining or competing carriers pending
a decision on a merger or other long term solution where one carrier was in financial
distress. Id. See also Air Freight Forwarder Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 69-4-100
(Apr. 21, 1969), affff'd sub. nom, ABC Air Freight v. C.A.B., 419 F.2d 154 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (various relationships between surface car-
riers and air freight forwarders approved and disapproved); Capitol Airways, Inc.,
C.A.B. Order No. 68-12-74 (Dec. 13, 1968) (control of phase of aeronautics/air taxi by
trunk carrier approved); Cook Cleland et ux., Control-Interlocking Relationships, 11
C.A.B. 295 (1950) (common control of phase of aeronautics and "large irregular" air
carrier approved).
"s Senate Hearings 41-42.
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theless, nothing said by the Board with respect to Public Law 91-62
before, or since, its enactment indicates a disposition contrary to the
approach suggested by Secretary Cherington. Thus, while it is difficult
to forecast the response to a particular control application, in all
probability the Board will avoid unduly subjective inquires and limit
its concern to those facts tending to show that the proposed acquisi-
tion may have a clear, direct and substantial adverse effect upon the
ability of an air carrier to perform its certificated services.
C. The prospects for more certainty and procedural simplicity.
As noted above, the Board's far reaching concepts of control, com-
bined with the legislative history of Public Law 91-62, create pre-
cisely the kind of uncertainty that led the agency to oppose the type
of bill that was enacted. Countless actions that were once clearly
outside the statute now fall in a vast gray area where the only guide-
posts are cases decided under a different statute with different objec-
tives. Had it taken the advice of the Board and the Department of
Transportation, Congress could have avoided most of these uncer-
tainties. Its failure to do so, however, does not require those affected
to operate in a zone of perpetual twilight. The CAB advice was re-
jected, but its processes were not immobilized.
1. Rulemaking
The Board has extensive inherent," as well as explicit," power to
act by rulemaking when control is involved. Under section 408, how-
ever, the Board has, up to now, acted primarily by adjudication. This
approach is now more questionable than ever. The accretion of Board
decisions has tended to build up theories of control with obsolete or
legally questionable credentials. Theories involving control of, or by,
surface carriers obviously need a general reexamination now that air
transportation has matured. So does the Board's tendency to equate
influence with "control" in a statutory sense. The problems of recon-
ciling these earlier views with the Board's new jurisdiction simply
intensify a need for reexamination. That need is too broad and too
immediate for the case-by-case approach. As the Board's testimony
pointed out, investors, managers, and others on whom airlines depend
for their development must be able to act with reasonably certain
knowledge of what the law requires of them. Rulemaking can shed
far more light far more quickly than adjudication.
"See generally note 91, infra.
85 Section 204 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1964). See, e.g., 14
C.F.R. § 299.2 (1970), exempting air carriers from §5 408(a) (2), (3) of the Federal
Aviation Act insofar as the provisions relate to the purchase or lease of aircraft from
another air carrier or person engaged in a phase of aeronautics. See also 14 C.F.R.
5 399.19 (1970), setting forth standards for § 408 approval of wet leases to foreign
air carriers.
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(a) Statutory Interpretation by Rule
Part 399 of the Board's Regulations contains several illustrations
of how the Board may state its views on questions of statutory inter-
pretation in the absence of a specific case."8 There is no reason why
some of the vexing questions which arise out of Public Law 91-62
cannot be dealt with in this manner.
(b) Disclaimer of Jurisdiction by Rule
As previously noted, the Board has sometimes elected not to pierce
the corporate veil in situations involving indirect control. In such
instances, rather than approve the transaction, it has declined to take
jurisdiction."' Public Law 91-62 creates new opportunities for the
Board to decline to take jurisdiction with respect to remote relation-
ships that did not concern Congress, and should not concern the Board.
Jurisdiction in these matters should be disclaimed in advance.
(c) Exemption by Rule
As revised by Public Law 91-62, section 408(a) (5) contains new
authority permitting the Board to exempt any acquisition of control
of a non-certificated air carrier (such as an air taxi or air freight for-
warder). This power has thus far been used in a number of specific
cases.8 It should be possible to define the cases where such exemptions
would be granted routinely and to do so in advance by rule.
Under section 416 of the Federal Aviation Act,89 the Board may
also exempt air carriers from most of the provisions of Title IV, in-
cluding section 408. The Board has used this power to grant a blanket
exemption for certain sales and leases covered by section 408 (a) (2)
and (3). Exemptions under section 416 can only be granted when
the acquiring party is an air carrier but this authority would be useful
should the Board find that section 408(a)(5) should be inverted
to preclude acquisitions of control by air carriers of "any other person."
8 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 399.92 (1970): "The Board interprets section 409 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, as making unlawful, unless approved by
order of the Board, interlocking relationships between an air carrier and a person con-
trolling another air carrier."
7 See note 47, supra. It will be noted that disclaimers occur only in instances where
intervening corporate entities distinguish the relationship from those literally covered
by the statute. The Board does not assert the right to decline or to take jurisdiction in
the latter situations.
88 See, e.g., John D. Betz, C.A.B. Order No. 70-6-136 (Jun. 24, 1970); Surf-Air, Inc.,
C.A.B. Order No. 70-4-85 (Apr. 17, 1970); Golden Gate Enterprises, Inc., C.A.B. Order
No. 70-4-17 (Apr. 3, 1970); Enterprise Shipping Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 70-2-11
(Feb. 4, 1970); Universal Air Freight Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 70-1-156 (Jan. 30,
1970); Military Purchase System, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-11-83 (Nov. 19, 1969);
Prinair, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 69-11-5 (Nov. 4, 1969). The Board can always provide
for termination of a blanket exemption in any particular case where, upon individual
examination of the facts, it appears warranted. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 299.4 (1970).
8949 U.S.C. S 1386 (1964).
90 14 C.F.R. § 299.2 (1970). See note 85, supra.
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(d) Approval by Rule
Despite specific language in section 408 calling for a hearing, it
may be possible for the Board to grant approvals without hearing if
it acts by rule. The courts appear to be receptive to the notion that
the requirements of adjudicatory proceedings are not applicable if
the agency acts with respect to an entire class." This alternative could
be useful in disposing of some of the new relationships placed under
Board jurisdiction when there are no substantial reasons for withholding
approval.
2. Expedited Adjudicatory Proceedings
Some cases will not be susceptible to disposition by rule. The alter-
native, however, need not be lengthy periods of uncertainty while the
parties to executory acquisitions trudge through prehearing confer-
ences, hearings, briefs to the examiner, petitions for review, briefs to
the Board, oral argument, etc. "Show cause" procedures can be used
in certain circumstances." In addition, the Board can establish special
hearing procedures allowing for a reasonably prompt decision."3 Under
Subparts "M" and "N" of its procedural regulations, the Board has
accomplished this for certain types of certificate amendment cases.'
Similar procedures could be established for cases under section 408
involving acquisitions by "any other person."
3. Post Facto Approval
Finally, the Board still has the power to allow parties to consum-
mate transactions before the hearing. Traditionally, the Board has
asserted that section 408 requires prior approval. In the oft-cited
Sherman case,3 the Board announced that it would not approve acqui-
sitions already consummated unless the parties first restored the status
"See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See also American Airlines v.
C.A.B. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Flying Tiger
Line, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965).
"4The Board has made extensive use of show cause procedures in lieu of hearings
under 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964) (certificate awards) and 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1964) (mail
rates). More detailed hearing requirements of section 408(b) coupled with the special
procedures set forth in the third proviso have not prevented the Board from using show
cause procedures in unusual circumstances involving control pendente lite. American
Airlines, Inc. & Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 70-2-43 (Feb. 11,
1970); Hughes Tool Co., C.A.B. Order No. 69-3-11 (Mar. 5, 1969).
"In merger cases, the Board has consistently taken the view that the parties, whose
futures are in part frozen until the Board decides the case, are entitled to expedited
action. Similar reasons apply to acquisitions of control.
14 C.F.R. § 302.1301-15, 1401-15 (1970). These proceedings apply to certain
restriction removal situations. No prehearing conference is held; evidence is submitted
in written form with the application or answer; oral testimony is generally prohibited;
and time periods for all steps are shortened materially.
"Sherman, Interlocking Relationships, 15 C.A.B. 876 (1952).
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quo ante. The statute, however, says nothing about prior approval,
and the Sherman doctrine, which was not applied even in the case
which fathered it, has been waived on numerous occasions since then
to permit post facto approval." As the Board's frequent Sherman
waivers make clear, there is nothing inherently wrong with after-the-
fact approval. Indeed, there would seem to be a definite advantage
to the Board and the parties in identifying areas where approval would
generally be routine and allowing completion of the transactions, pro-
vided an application is submitted to the Board at the same time.
The harm to the public or parties in those few cases where after-the-
fact hearings might lead to disapproval would be more than out-
weighed by numerous situations where transactions were facilitated in-
stead of delayed.
D. CONCLUSION
The dangers of hasty legislative action dealing with immediate
problems are nowhere better illustrated than in Public Law 91-62. With
the passage of time, the concerns that prompted this urgent enactment
have become more obscure while its unforeseen ramifications have be-
come more clear. It is doubtful whether in today's climate this legisla-
tion would receive as fast or as favorable treatment as it did. Never-
theless, it is now the law, and those who ignore it, or misread its
meaning, do so at some risk.
As shown above, several things can be done, short of repealing or
amending Public Law 91-62, to make it work sensibly. Despite Con-
gress' insistence that the Board have more substantive and less proced-
ural discretion than it asked for, there remains a substantial array of
options for defining the law and shortening procedures. In administering
other sections of the Act, the Board has shown that it can use these
options imaginatively and aggressively. No area under CAB supervision
is more in need of jurisdictional pruning and procedural innovation
than the administration of the new section 408. That can happen if
the CAB will apply its substantial skills to the tools at hand.
" See, e.g., Aerovias Sud Americana, Sherman Doctrine Waiver, 42 C.A.B. 855
(1965); Allegheny Airlines, Enforcement Proceeding, 41 C.A.B. 743 (1964). In Na-
tional Airlines, Inc., & Lewis B. Maytag, Jr., Interlocking Relationships, 40 C.A.B. 161
(1964), the Board stated the following concerning the question of prior approval: "The
Board may waive the doctrine when it appears that had the parties realized the rela-
tionship was subject to the Board's jurisdiction, they would have filed a timely applica-
tion for approval."
Research fails to disclose a single instance where the Sherman doctrine was spe-
cifically applied.
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